Fair payments for effective environmental conservation by Loft, Lasse et al.
Fair payments for effective environmental conservation
Lasse Lofta,1, Stefan Gehrigb, Carl Salkc, and Jens Rommeld
aWorking Group Governance of Ecosystem Services, Leibniz Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research, 15374 Müncheberg, Germany; bPrivate address,
10961 Berlin, Germany; cSouthern Swedish Forest Research Centre, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 23053 Alnarp, Sweden; and dDepartment of
Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 75651 Ultuna, Uppsala, Sweden
Edited by Arun Agrawal, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, and approved May 7, 2020 (received for review November 11, 2019)
Global efforts for biodiversity protection and land use-based
greenhouse gas mitigation call for increases in the effectiveness
and efficiency of environmental conservation. Incentive-based pol-
icy instruments are key tools for meeting these goals, yet their
effectiveness might be undermined by such factors as social norms
regarding whether payments are considered fair. We investigated
the causal link between equity and conservation effort with a
randomized real-effort experiment in forest conservation with
443 land users near a tropical forest national park in the Vietnam-
ese Central Annamites, a global biodiversity hotspot. The experi-
ment introduced unjustified payment inequality based on luck, in
contradiction of local fairness norms that were measured through
responses to vignettes. Payment inequality was perceived as less
fair than payment equality. In agreement with our preregistered
hypotheses, participants who were disadvantaged by unequal
payments exerted significantly less conservation effort than other
participants receiving the same payment under an equal distribu-
tion. No effect was observed for participants advantaged by in-
equality. Thus, equity effects on effort can have consequences for
the effectiveness and efficiency of incentive-based conservation
instruments. Furthermore, we show that women exerted substan-
tially more conservation effort than men, and that increasing pay-
ment size unexpectedly reduced effort. This emphasizes the need
to consider social comparisons, local equity norms, and gender in
environmental policies using monetary incentives to motivate
behavioral change.
payments for ecosystem services | climate change | biodiversity | behavioral
economics | environmental justice
The ambitious scope of global conservation and carbon se-questration goals and limited funding dedicated to their
implementation (1–3) necessitate increasing the cost-effectiveness
of conservation policy instruments. Incentive-based policy instru-
ments are at the forefront of global efforts to meet these goals
(4–6). Conservation incentives aim to achieve multiple goals of
sustainable development, including biodiversity preservation, hu-
man well-being, and social equity (7, 8). In low-income regions
where local livelihoods often depend on natural resources, pay-
ments complement restrictive conservation measures, such as
protected areas (9). Whether incentives can achieve these multiple
goals and what trade-offs among them are unavoidable are im-
portant unanswered questions (10, 11).
Efficiency and equity are often portrayed as competing policy
goals, based on the concern that equitable redistribution might
consume resources and undermine the power of incentives to
motivate behavior (11, 12). For instance, it can be efficient to pay
recipients more for the conservation of areas that are larger,
more threatened, or of higher ecological value, but this may dis-
advantage those endowed with less land or land of lower conser-
vation value, even if they bear similar personal costs of conservation
(13, 14). As another example, many programs incentivize groups or
communities rather than individuals to reduce transaction costs.
Improved cost-effectiveness may be undermined by privileged de-
mographic groups capturing most of the benefits rather than
households that contribute the most to conservation (15, 16).
Equity concerns and social norms of fairness strongly influence
human behavior (17–21). Such effects are often asymmetric;
disadvantageous inequality has a greater impact than advanta-
geous inequality (17, 18, 20, 21). As a consequence, equity could
affect conservation effectiveness and efficiency (22–24), partic-
ularly among disadvantaged recipients. This raises the question
of whether social equity and environmental conservation might
be codependent rather than competing goals. For example, in-
equity might weaken recipients’ morale to exert conservation
efforts, thereby undermining environmental effectiveness (25–27).
Consequently, addressing fairness may achieve better environ-
mental outcomes and even improve cost effectiveness (26, 28, 29).
Although it is a prominent conjecture in the literature, sys-
tematic evidence on how fairness affects an incentive-based
policy’s environmental effectiveness is scarce (8, 30, 31), due in
part to methodological challenges. This leaves policymakers in
the dark about how much equity matters from an effectiveness or
efficiency perspective. To address this knowledge gap, we un-
dertook this study of causal links between equity in environ-
mental incentives with conservation effort outcomes.
We used real-effort field experiments with a total of 443 land
users from 14 randomly selected villages near a national park in
the Vietnamese Central Annamites, a global biodiversity hot-
spot. Although local deforestation has become less severe in
recent years, the region’s native forests are now at risk of re-
duced regeneration due to defaunation caused by hunting and
human-induced habitat fragmentation (32, 33). This poses a
threat to rainforest stocks, local livelihoods (34), and species
Significance
Incentive-based measures are increasingly popular to alleviate
ongoing biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions from
land use change. However, effectively using scarce conserva-
tion funds remains a major challenge. Using behavioral eco-
nomic experiments in the buffer zone of a Vietnamese national
park, we show that unfair payment distributions that are be-
yond land users’ control can reduce the environmental effec-
tiveness of incentives, and that women exert more effort. Our
study region is threatened by forest degradation and is part of
the nationwide Vietnamese Payments for Forest Ecosystem
Services program, making it an important and relevant context
for improving the effectiveness of conservation measures.
These results show that policymakers aiming for effective and
efficient programs should pay close attention to fairness
and gender.
Author contributions: L.L., S.G., C.S., and J.R. designed research; L.L. and J.R. performed
research; L.L., S.G., C.S., and J.R. analyzed data; and L.L., S.G., C.S., and J.R. wrote
the paper.
The authors declare no competing interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).
Data deposition: The data supporting the findings of this study and all analysis scripts are
available at https://github.com/stefgehrig/fairconservation.
1To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: lasse.loft@zalf.de.
This article contains supporting information online at https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/
doi:10.1073/pnas.1919783117/-/DCSupplemental.
First published June 10, 2020.
14094–14101 | PNAS | June 23, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 25 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1919783117
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
at
 S
VE
RI
G
ES
 L
AN
TB
RU
KS
UN
IV
ER
SI
TE
TS
 U
LT
UN
A 
BI
BL
IO
TE
KE
T,
 S
LU
 L
ib
ra
ry
 o
n 
Ju
ly 
7,
 2
02
0 
diversity (32), ultimately affecting globally-desired carbon se-
questration and biodiversity outcomes (35). The Vietnamese
national Payments for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES) pro-
gram has been in place here since 2011, but doubts about its
social equity have been raised (34), making the region particu-
larly relevant for our research questions.
Methods and Data
Conceptual Background on Equality and Equity. While the concept
of equity in policymaking has multiple dimensions (26, 36, 37),
here we focus on distributional equity. Personal accountability is
central to theories of fairness developed by scholars from diverse
disciplines, including philosophy (e.g., ref. 38), economics (e.g.,
ref. 39), political science (e.g., ref. 40) and psychology (e.g., ref.
41). According to these theories, a distribution is fair if, under
equal opportunities, individual rewards are proportional to input
factors that people are responsible for, such as effort, but do not
depend on circumstances beyond their control, such as luck.
Thus, as the seminal article by Adams (41) put it, when “out-
comes and inputs are not in balance in relation to those of
others, feelings of inequity result” (p. 280). The “accountability
principle” (39, 42), also called “liberal egalitarianism” (43), dis-
tinguishes equity from equality, because whether (in)equality is
equitable depends on whether the input that people can “rea-
sonably influence” is equal (39). There is ample evidence that
people prefer distributions that follow relative deservingness
rather than strict equality or chance (41–46), even across cul-
turally distant societies (40), and have strong moral disapproval
of luck-based inequality (47). By following the accountability
principle as a concept of distributional equity, we can test the
general implications of equity for outcomes of incentive-based
conservation policies in an experiment: When all relevant vari-
ables that the beneficiary can influence are kept constant,
recipients should receive an equal share of the total reward. This
opens a path for experimental manipulation of equity.
Experimental Design and Data Collection. Following the push to
address human behavior and psychology in development and sus-
tainability policy research (48, 49), we used economic laboratory-in-
the-field experiments, a valuable tool in conservation planning (23,
24, 50, 51). For transparency, we preregistered our main hypoth-
eses and analytical methods before data collection (http://
aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=k4ij32).
Our experiment was based on a real-effort task (52): for a
piece-rate payment, participants filled biodegradable bags with
fertile soil to grow seedlings for reforestation in cooperation with
local forest rangers (see Fig. 2A). Non-governmental organiza-
tions or tree nurseries in the study region typically hire seasonal
workers for this activity to restore forests. Such reforestation
activities can help rebuild natural habitats, contributing to bio-
diversity conservation (53, 54). Activity-based measures are part
of many PES programs (55), including those in Vietnam (34, 56),
China (57, 58), Mexico (4, 59), and Ethiopia (60), and contribute
to climate change mitigation (61) (SI Appendix, section 1.1.1).
This adds an important layer of realism to the experimental task,
making it akin to a small intervention with tangible environ-
mental benefits. From the pool of villages with >250 inhabitants
in and near Bach Ma National Park in central Vietnam and
enrolled in the national PFES scheme, 14 villages and 1 pilot vil-
lage were selected at random to take part in the experiment (Fig. 1;
village details in SI Appendix, section 1.4). Ethics of the experiment
were approved by the German Association for Experimental
Economic Research (SI Appendix, section 1.4).
Thirty-two participants were enrolled in each village on the day
of the activity from the community’s public area (participant data
summarized in SI Appendix, section 1.5). The total number of
participants was based on an a priori power calculation (SI Ap-
pendix, section 1.4).
In each session, we briefly introduced the task to all partici-
pants, sought the participants’ informed consent, and conducted
a 5-min unpaid training run to teach participants how to prepare
the soil bags (Fig. 2A). We recorded the number of bags that
each participant filled during training as a proxy for skill. Enu-
merators were randomized to groups and were blinded to
treatment while giving the general task instructions (full in-
structions in SI Appendix, section 1.2). Five participants withdrew
during the experiment and left with only the show-up fee (SI
Appendix, section 1.2.7), leaving a sample size of n = 443.
Fig. 1. Study area. Fifteen visited villages in Nam Ðông District in the buffer zone of Bach Ma National Park (Lower Right), of Thừa Thiên-Huế Province
(Upper Right), Vietnam (Left). See SI Appendix, section 1.4 for details on villages.
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Participants had 60 min to perform the task and could freely
communicate within, but not among groups (see below). The
experiment was concluded by a short survey and a debriefing
with a group discussion. Participants received a show-up fee of
30,000 Vietnamese dong (equal to 1.29 USD at the time of the
study) plus their earnings from the real-effort task (total mean
earnings 3.01 ± 0.52 USD, roughly 175% of the median daily
income reported in the survey).
We applied four treatments in a 2 × 2 design (Fig. 2B). Sub-
jects were either paid a low (400 VND/piece = 0.017 USD/piece)
or a high (600 VND/piece = 0.026 USD/piece) per-piece rate
and were either seated in a group with an equal (all receiving the
same rate) or an unequal (one-half receiving the high rate and
the other half the low rate) distribution. Each group had eight
participants. In each village, there were two groups with equal
distributions (one low rate, one high rate) and two groups with
unequal distributions. We counted the number of soil bags for
reforestation produced by each participant within the fixed time,
which is our measure of conservation effort.
Subjects were paid based on individual effort; the group only
served as a frame for distributional fairness, and others’ per-
formance did not affect individual payoffs. Participants drew a
number for random assignment to a group, where they took a
seat. Treatments were revealed to participants in their groups
after the training run. Enumerators randomly distributed enve-
lopes with the piece rate to everyone, and it was common knowl-
edge within a group, but not among groups, how many people in
the group earned the high pay rate and how many received the low
pay rate (but who received what was not known to enumerators or
to other subjects in the group unless they disclosed it themselves
during the task).
The starting conditions and opportunities in the experiment to
generate income were kept equal except for the exogenously and
randomly determined distribution of piece rates, creating a set-
ting in which, according to the accountability principle, pay rate
equality should be perceived as equitable. Subjects had no reason
to believe that their peers deserved a different pay rate, arguably
inducing inequity. The group with the same absolute piece rate
but without inequality served as a control to estimate the causal
effects of disadvantageous inequality (low pay in an unequal
group) and advantageous inequality (high pay in an unequal
group) on conservation effort, independent of absolute pay.
Thus, within-group payment differences were a manipulation of
incentive fairness (SI Appendix, section 2.1). Similar inequalities
in pay for proactive conservation behavior can also be found in
many real-world programs, such as Vietnam’s PFES scheme,
China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program, and agri-environmental
measures in the European Union (SI Appendix, section 1.1.2).
To test whether unjustified pay inequality indeed violated lo-
cally held fairness norms, we assessed participants’ general en-
dorsement of the accountability principle using four vignettes
that describe scenarios of two people sharing the benefits of joint
work (adapted from ref. 42; see SI Appendix, section 1.3). In each
vignette, participants had to decide whether the described
benefit-sharing scenario was fair or unfair; the number of re-
sponses conforming to the accountability principle yielded a score
from 0 to 4 for each subject. To assess whether unequal pay in the
experiment affected fairness perceptions, we recorded partici-
pants’ judgment of their pay rate’s fairness on a five-point scale
and, in an open-ended follow-up question, asked them why and
what they thought about it. More details on data collection and
the survey questions are provided in SI Appendix, section 1.2.
Hypotheses. We hypothesized that an unequal distribution de-
creases conservation effort, and does so more strongly for low-
paid (disadvantaged) individuals than for high-paid (advantaged)
individuals. We also hypothesized that larger payments lead to
greater effort independent of distribution effects (see preregis-
tration, SI Appendix, section 1.4). Concerning participants’ per-
ceptions, we further expected that they would endorse the
accountability principle of fairness, and that the inequality treat-
ment would negatively affect judgment of payment fairness (but
hypotheses for survey results were not preregistered).
Statistical Analysis. Task outcomes were analyzed using linear
mixed-effect models with the package lme4 (62) in R version
3.6.2 (63), specifying village as a random effect to control for
within-village correlation in individuals’ conservation effort (SI
Appendix, sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.5). Following our hypotheses, we
show models for the effect of inequality among low-paid par-
ticipants only (Table 1, models 1 and 2), among high-paid par-
ticipants only (models 3 and 4), and for the interaction of pay
rate with inequality among all participants (model 5). Fairness
perceptions were analyzed using ordinal logit mixed-effects mod-
els in the package ordinal (64). Following our preregistered
Fig. 2. Experimental setup. (A) The real-effort task. Participants filled biodegradable bags with fertile soil to be used by forest rangers to grow seedlings for
local reforestation. (B) Example of experimental implementation in one of the villages. Thirty-two participants were assigned at random to four groups of
eight (two with equal pay, two with unequal pay), with all groups seated separately during payment assignment, task instructions, training run (5 min), and
the incentivized experiment (60 min). The clothing colors of high-paid/low-paid participants illustrate the random seating within the unequal groups.
14096 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1919783117 Loft et al.
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robustness procedure, we conducted all regression analyses both
with and without a predefined set of control variables (Table 1 and
SI Appendix, section 2.1.3), as well as with and without outliers
beyond 1.5 times the interquartile range (10 outliers; see obser-
vations beyond the boxplot whiskers in Fig. 3; more details in SI
Appendix, section 1.6). Given that performance in real-effort tasks
typically shows exceptionally high variance (65), removing extreme
values can increase statistical precision. Notably, most outliers
were participants whose behavior was peculiar to enumerators in
the field, and all outliers were overly influential in regression
models (Cook’s distance > N/4; SI Appendix, section 1.6), sug-
gesting that they might also bias estimation of average effects.
Thus, we report outlier-adjusted results (n = 433) for all analyses
of conservation effort. We report the same analyses including
outliers (n = 443) in SI Appendix, section 2.1.3. In addition, the
robustness of regression-based inference for the treatment effects
was assessed with exact P values from randomization tests (66) (SI
Appendix, section 2.1.2). Models were also run with additional
random intercepts for group ID and SEs clustered at the group
level (SI Appendix, section 2.1.3). The conclusions are qualitatively
robust to differences among these analyses.
The data that support the findings of this study and all analysis
scripts are publicly available at https://github.com/stefgehrig/
fairconservation (68).
Results
Disadvantaged Participants Work Less in Unequally Paid Groups.
Among participants who earned the low pay rate, those in
unequal-payment groups exerted significantly less effort than
those in equal-payment groups (Fig. 3). The estimated reduction
in effort was 0.42 SD (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.19 to 0.66)
and varied between 0.29 and 0.42 SD for different specifications
(Table 1, models 1, 2, 5; raw statistics on conservation effort by
treatment and their paired comparisons are provided in SI Ap-
pendix, sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2). These effects held, although
with smaller effect sizes, in otherwise identical models without
outlier adjustment (0.16 to 0.25 SD; SI Appendix, section 2.1.3).
In summary, low-paid participants reduced their effort when
other peers in their group earned more for the same work due to
luck during randomization. For participants earning the high pay
rate, there was no difference in effort between the equal and
unequal conditions (Table 1, models 3 and 4). This means that
only disadvantageous and not advantageous payment inequality
decreased the conservation effort, with the difference itself being
significant (interaction effect; Table 1, model 5).
Unequal Pay Is Viewed as Unfair. Responses to the vignettes on
social norms of benefit sharing show high endorsement of the
accountability principle (i.e., accountability should depend on
effort and not on external influences on outcomes) and thus of
equality of pay rates as an equitable distribution mechanism. A
significant majority of participants gave at least three out of four
vignette responses consistent with the accountability principle
(85% vs. 31.25% expectation by chance alone; binomial test, P <
0.001) (Fig. 4A); detailed vignette results in SI Appendix, section
2.5). The scenarios presented in the vignettes were not related to
the content of the experiment, and results did not differ between
the equal and unequal conditions (χ2df = 3 = 3.4, P = 0.33). Thus,
as intended, our random assignment of lower payment rates in
the unequal condition violated local equity norms.
Participants in the equal-pay groups tended to judge their own
payment as fairer compared with those in unequal-pay groups
(Fig. 4B). The odds ratio for giving a lower fairness rating in the
unequal condition compared with the equal condition was 1.42
(95% CI, 0.99 to 2.03; P = 0.053, ordinal logit mixed-effect
model controlling for absolute pay rate with random intercepts
for village; n = 442) (SI Appendix, section 2.4). In contrast to the
effect on effort (see above), participants’ evaluation of the
fairness of the inequality treatment did not differ between sub-
jects with different (high/low) pay rates (interaction effect, P =
0.52). Overall, fairness ratings were surprisingly high: three out
of four participants across all treatments rated their payment as
either “very fair” or “somewhat fair.” However, in the open-
ended follow-up question, the proportion of participants who
gave a lower fairness rating (“undecided,” “not so fair,” or “not
fair at all”) explicitly due to considerations of others’ pay rates
was higher in unequal groups (14% vs. 7%; χ2df = 1 = 4.0, P =
0.045) (more details and analyses in SI Appendix, section 2.6).
Participants in unequal groups were significantly more likely to
refer to pay rates of other participants in their response to this
question (24% vs. 12%; χ2df = 1 = 10.0, P = 0.002). This means
that even though participants generally regarded the experi-
mental payments as fair, our inequality treatment successfully
reduced participants’ fairness judgments, and for the expected
reasons.
Interaction and mediation analyses showed no association of
the presented individual-level survey responses (score for en-
dorsement of accountability principle, fairness judgment) with the
effect of inequality on effort (SI Appendix, section 2.1.4). Note,
however, that our study was neither intended nor powered to
detect such effects.
Higher Pay Rate Reduces Conservation Effort. Contrary to our ex-
pectations, people who received the high pay rate in equal groups
worked less than those receiving the low pay rate in equal groups
(Table 1, model 5). The effect was sizeable, with an estimated 0.45
SD (95% CI, 0.27 to 0.63) reduction in effort for the higher
pay rate.
Women Exert More Conservation Effort. On average, women (60%
of all participants) produced significantly more bags in the avail-
able time compared with men (Table 1). Importantly, the gender
Fig. 3. Conservation effort as a function of pay distribution (equal vs. un-
equal) and pay rate (low vs. high). Effort was measured as the number of soil
bags that participants prepared for reforestation in 60 min. Observations
outside the whiskers are treated as outliers following the preregistered
procedure (SI Appendix, section 1.5) and are not included in models reported
in Table 1, but are included in SI Appendix, section 2.1.3. The figure is based
on ref. 67.
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difference remained substantial when controlling for performance
in the highly-predictive 5-min training period and for previous
experience with the task (Table 1, model 5). This suggests that the
observed gender difference is not due to an advantage for women
in skill or experience in the task. After finding the gender effect,
we explored interaction effects between the unequal treatment
and gender and found no significant association (SI Appendix,
section 2.1.4).
Discussion and Conclusion
Our study has empirically shown that disadvantageous inequity
in payment distribution reduces effort in incentive-based conser-
vation instruments. By using a randomized real-effort experiment
that manipulates equity, we circumvent problems of confounding
variables, reverse causality, or hard-to-appraise environmental
effects of observational approaches. Thus, we provide evidence
that equity is not merely a desirable side objective, but a central
design feature of these instruments (69). In our experiment, par-
ticipants who were disadvantaged by randomly-assigned unequal
payments exerted significantly less conservation effort than par-
ticipants receiving the same payment when peers earning more
were absent, although the exact size of the effect is sensitive to
outliers. In line with field experiment studies from more conven-
tional labor markets (17–19), this suggests that dissatisfaction with
unjustified payment inequality reduces working morale in the re-
forestation activity. Since our experimental design eliminates low
pay as a cause per se, social comparisons and resulting emotions
like anger, envy, or resentment are most likely the main psycho-
logical drivers of the effect (41). The reduction in effort has effi-
ciency implications for conservation initiatives when fixed costs,
such as setting up a bureaucracy or paying wages to ground staff,
are considered. Other things being equal, a fixed conservation goal
could be achieved faster with the same resources when payments
are equitable. Efficiency gains should be expected if perceived
equity can be improved without large additional costs.
Being advantaged by inequality did not affect conservation
effort in either direction. This resonates with seminal behavioral
economic research showing people to be less concerned about
advantageous inequality compared with disadvantageous in-
equality (18, 20, 21). The average effect of the inequality treat-
ment across both pay rates therefore trended nonsignificantly
negative (SI Appendix, section 2.1). Because real-world in-
equalities are often larger than in our experiment and leave
many underprivileged to the advantage of only a few, rather than
Fig. 4. Fairness perceptions. Survey responses on (A) participants’ en-
dorsement of the accountability principle of fairness, measured as the pro-
portion of responses to the four vignette scenarios that satisfy the
accountability principle and on (B) participants’ judgment about the fairness
of their own payment on a five-point scale, split by equal or unequal
payment treatment.
Table 1. Linear mixed-effect models of the conservation effort
Dependent variable: conservation effort (no. of bags)
Low pay rate High pay rate All
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Unequal −0.42 (0.12)*** −0.35 (0.09)*** 0.06 (0.12) 0.12 (0.09) −0.29 (0.09)***
Female 0.51 (0.10)*** 0.37 (0.11)*** 0.40 (0.08)***
Training run 0.59 (0.05)*** 0.57 (0.06)*** 0.58 (0.04)***
High pay rate −0.45 (0.09)***
Unequal x high pay rate 0.41 (0.13)***
Additional controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 216 212 217 212 424
Marginal R2 0.04 0.5 0 0.43 0.47
Conditional R2 0.25 0.59 0.27 0.54 0.55
Log-likelihood −905.8 −884.2 −912.2 −829.4 −1,654.9
The table shows the effect of unequal distribution for subjects with low payment (disadvantaged inequality) in models 1 and 2 and for subjects with high
payment (advantaged inequality) in models 3 and 4. Model 5 includes all subjects and shows the effect of pay rate and the interaction between pay rate and
unequal distribution. All models contain random intercepts for village. Dependent and independent variables (except dummy variables for treatments) are
standardized to have a mean of 0 and SD of 1. Additional controls refer to survey responses on sociodemographic factors, environmental concern, and the
task. SI Appendix, section 2.1.3 provides model coefficients, and SI Appendix, Table S4 provides summary statistics for these variables. Models without
preregistered outlier adjustment are reported in SI Appendix, section 2.1.3. Marginal and conditional R2 refer to explained variance excluding and including
variance captured by random effects, respectively (50). Minor sample size variations are due to survey nonresponse.
*P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01.
14098 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1919783117 Loft et al.
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a 1:1 ratio as in our inequality treatment, the aggregate effect of
unfair payments across the advantaged and disadvantaged could
be larger. These findings predict adverse consequences of real-
world problems such as inequality in natural resource benefits
due to elite capture or conservation programs that inadvertently
benefit actors with preexisting land endowments or who come
from advantaged ethnicities, castes, or other demographic cate-
gories. Such inequities are rampant in the PES program in the
studied population (34) and are widespread globally (28, 29, 70)
(SI Appendix, section 1.1.2).
Responses to the nonincentivized survey show that unequal
payments were indeed perceived as less fair. This supports the
view that the experimental outcome resulted from fairness vio-
lations leading to dissatisfaction and demotivation, particularly
among low-paid participants (21). Participants overwhelmingly
endorsed the accountability principle in the four vignettes, sup-
porting the view that the unequal payment treatment violated
local fairness norms by basing payments on luck rather than
deservingness. Yet, the treatment effect on judgment about the
fairness of one’s pay was small (Fig. 4B). This may be due to
overly positive reporting to please the experimenters or to the
relatively high payment that participants received, even at the
low payment rate. Experimental piece rates were 1.5 to 3 times
the payment that regular tree nurseries pay for the same activity,
and substantial relative to local average incomes. In the open-
ended survey responses, participants often explained their fair-
ness judgment with reference to pay rates or total payments in
general (42%) rather than compared with other participants’ pay
rates in the experiment, or with the lightness, fun, or usefulness
of the work (29%) (SI Appendix, section 2.6).
Future research should examine how these findings play out in
other geographical and cultural contexts. For example, the
implementation of an incentive-based program in Bolivia actu-
ally increased concerns for accountability as a fairness principle
(71). The social expectation to be treated fairly is higher in
Vietnam than in most other countries, according to World
Values Survey data (SI Appendix, section 2.7), and motivational
consequences of (un)fairness could be moderated by such
cultural beliefs.
We found that participants worked less when paid more, which
is counterintuitive. Workers may have an aspiration level, pur-
suing a target income per unit of time beyond which more pay
does not lead to more effort (72, 73). This would mean that
highly-paid participants were more quickly satisfied with their
session earnings. Alternatively, increasing financial rewards
could have crowded out intrinsic motivation (74). However, in
the classical model, this effect occurs when small incentives are
introduced to an incentive-free setting (75, 76), which was not
the case here. Backfiring “overpayment” is a possibility consis-
tent with our results, with effort decreasing when already very
high (compared with local earnings) payments are further in-
creased, as in our experiment. For example, one participant
stated in the open-ended survey question: “People who get a low
pay rate try to fill the soil bags quickly, while people with a high
pay rate slow down.” This is an important finding, suggesting that
investments in distributional equity in comparably high-paying
programs could yield larger conservation gains than invest-
ments in even higher payment levels. However, it cannot nec-
essarily be expected to apply when real-world programs pay
relatively little. Given that real-world conservation payments
usually do not exceed local wages, and that conservation incen-
tives typically focus on the global poor, the target population’s
socio-economic standing should be considered when translating
this finding into policy.
Gender had a large effect on conservation effort in our ex-
periment. The finding that women contributed more to conser-
vation concurs with data from the same task in another region of
Vietnam (52) and with other experiments on conservation
incentives from Indonesia, Peru, and Tanzania (24). Importantly,
the effect remained large and significant when controlling for
training performance or prior task experience. It is therefore
unlikely that this result is due to mere activation of gender roles
in the bag packing activity, stronger reactions to experimenter
demand or higher ability, but rather is triggered by incentiviza-
tion of reforestation efforts. This emphasizes that investing more
responsibility and decision making power with women in incentive-
based conservation instruments can enhance not only gender eq-
uity, but also overall effectiveness (see also ref. 24).
An integral part of the study design was that subjects experi-
enced relative pay differences within groups. However, this
means that performance of subjects under different pay rates in
the unequal treatment were not fully independent. By working in
the same group and observing others’ effort, subjects could have
influenced one another beyond the intended treatment manip-
ulation, for instance, by conformity or competition. However, we
cannot think of a compelling reason why this would lead to only
low-paid workers in mixed groups adjusting to the (lower) ef-
fort of high-paid workers, but not vice versa. On the contrary,
previous work suggests that workers under piece-rate pay, if
anything, increase their own effort when observing low peer
effort (77).
Finally, the external validity of experimental results to real-
world programs is never fully guaranteed. We reduced this risk
by using a conservation-related task with tangible benefits for
tropical reforestation in a relevant target population (SI Ap-
pendix, section 1.1.1), while maintaining rigorous standards of
randomization and field protocols. This represents an in-
termediate approach to the “internal–external validity tradeoff”
that experimenters face (78). As in real conservation activities,
participants could reduce their effort both on the extensive
margin, by spending less time working and more time taking
breaks, socializing, or snacking, and on the intensive margin, by
working slower. We found that both were important; approxi-
mately 10% of the variation in experimental conservation effort
was explained by self-reported working time (P < 0.001) (SI
Appendix, section 2.3). In addition, a self-reported measure of
real-world forest protection behavior as encouraged by the Viet-
namese PFES program (e.g., active patrolling, firefighting) was
weakly positively correlated with participants’ effort in the task (SI
Appendix, section 2.2).
We conclude that social comparisons and norms are forces to
be harnessed for the design of successful conservation initiatives
(49). Our findings are important for global conservation and
sustainability goals, demonstrating the importance of payment
design and nonenvironmental motivations in incentive-based
conservation schemes and suggesting ways to increase effec-
tiveness and efficiency. Policymakers should work to understand
and use local equity norms, such as locally-preferred distribution
criteria (52), in the design and implementation of conservation
payments (13), particularly when developing targeting criteria,
rules, and monitoring procedures to determine payments (69).
Policy design should incorporate principles of accountability that
reflect the conservation choices that land users make given their
opportunities, not differences in exogenous characteristics such
as previous land endowments, ethnicity, financial and adminis-
trative literacy, or power (26). In the same vein, policies aiming
at high environmental returns should consider gender differ-
ences in the willingness to contribute to conservation, as dem-
onstrated in this study, rather than reinforcing existing gender
imbalances.
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